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This paper analyzes to which extent foreign plant ownership involves lower tax payments 
than domestic plant ownership. We employ a model of endogenous foreign subsidiary 
ownership to derive a set of empirically testable hypotheses about the differential taxation of 
foreign- and domestically-owned subsidiaries. We assess these hypotheses in a data- set of 
33,577 European foreign- and domestically-owned manufacturing plants. We identify a 
significant tax-saving of endogenous foreign owner- ship. On average, foreign owners pay 
594 Euros per employee or about 56 percent less than domestic owners of similar 
subsidiaries. This effect is larger in thinner markets with fewer plants, in markets with a 
greater relative presence of foreign owners, and for foreign owners of larger plants. 
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th December 2006 1 Introduction
The host country-speci¯c tax payments of foreign subsidiaries may di®er from
those of domestic ones for four major reasons: (i) alternative e®ective tax rates
that are composed of parent and host country statutory tax rates and de-
ductions from the tax base, (ii) transfer pricing, (iii) ¯nancial policies at the
¯rm-level, and (iv) preferential tax treatment of foreign-owned ¯rms. Each of
these reasons has produced its own sub-literature on the theory of taxation of
multinationals (see Hines, 1999; Gresik, 2001; Devereux, 2006, for comprehen-
sive surveys). The ¯rst one mainly focuses on the (optimal) design of methods
of double-taxation relief through tax treaties (see Bond and Samuelson, 1989;
Janeba, 1995; Davies, 2003, 2004) and their consequences for multinational
pro¯ts and the endogenous ¯rm organization (Davies, Egger, and Egger, 2006).
The second strand of research analyzes the possibilities of tax avoidance of
multinationals through the endogenous choice of prices of intermediate inputs
delivered among plants of the same ¯rm to minimize tax payments at the com-
pany level (see, e.g., Gordon and Wilson, 1986; Weichenrieder, 1996a; Hau°er
and Schjelderup, 2000; Bartelsman and Beetsma, 2003; Mintz and Smart, 2004).
The third aforementioned line of work determines a multinational ¯rm's optimal
debt policy depending on taxation (see, e.g., Grubert and Mutti, 1991; Hines
and Rice, 1994; Weichenrieder, 1998; Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2004; Huizinga,
Laeven, and Nicodµ eme, 2006). The fourth sub-literature considers the appli-
cation of distinct tax treatment for domestic and foreign-owned subsidiaries in
a given host country, e.g., via reduced statutory tax rates and/or additional
tax base allowances (see, e.g., Weichenrieder, 1996b; Keen, 2001; Janeba and
Smart, 2003; Haupt and Peters, 2005; Bucovetsky and Hau°er, 2006a,b).1
The above-mentioned theoretical literature suggests that the tax di®eren-
tial between foreign-owned and domestically-owned ¯rms could be substantial.
This paper aims at quantifying the overall tax savings of multinationals in a
data-set of 33;577 foreign- and domestically-owned subsidiaries in 27 European
countries. To derive theoretical hypotheses on the nexus between ¯rm organi-
zation and tax payments of foreign subsidiaries, we build on the aforementioned
work. Yet, we focus on an endogenous choice of a subsidiary's operation mode
in terms of foreign versus domestic ownership, while most of the existing work
(theoretical and empirical) takes this choice as given. Furthermore, we allude
1Recently, the OECD and the European Union proposed a 'Code of Conduct' against
harmful tax practices in business taxation (OECD, 1998, 2000; Commission of the European
Communities, 1998). The underlying objective is to prevent countries from providing prefer-
ential tax treatment to multinational ¯rms (see Eggert and Hau°er, 2006, for a discussion).
1to the role of local (regional) market characteristics such as market thickness
as well as ¯rm size for the tax savings of foreign-owned subsidiaries, where
previous work focused mainly on a single ¯rm type and a ¯xed number of (ho-
mogeneous) competitors at the host market. Empirically, we apply matching
methods to account for the endogeneity of the plant ownership mode. A major
¯nding is that a foreign-owned subsidiary pays substantially lower taxes than
its domestically-owned twin. The di®erence amounts to about 594 Euros per
employee or a fraction of 0:2 of their total assets, which corresponds to tax sav-
ings of foreign plant ownership of about 56 percent per employee as compared
to domestically owned plants.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The subsequent section
lays out a stylized theoretical model to derive the empirically testable hypothe-
ses. Section 3 describes the database, the econometric procedures, and the
central empirical ¯ndings. The last section concludes with a summary of the
most important results.
2 A model of endogenous foreign plant formation
and taxation
To understand the tax incentives when foreign plant ownership is endogenous we
develop a simple partial equilibrium model of foreign country which competes
for the location of an international producer against a second, low-tax country
(a tax haven). Speci¯cally, consider a market located in a foreign country where
N¡1 internationally immobile (local) ¯rms and one internationally mobile ¯rm
sell their entire production. The mobile ¯rm may choose serving the foreign
market via exports versus setting up a foreign subsidiary there (see Davies,
Egger, and Egger, 2006). This decision is determined by the existence of (non-
tari®) trade costs on exports and the tax rate di®erential between the foreign
and domestic markets a®ecting foreign subsidiary set-up. Here, we consider a
tax on pure pro¯ts as typically assumed in previous work (see, e.g., Hau°er and
Wooton, 1999; Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano, 2004). In the following, we
compute the ¯rm-speci¯c demand (and production) in two di®erent scenarios.
In the ¯rst state, the international producer serves the foreign market through
exports (indicated by subscript e) and in the second one it sets up a foreign
subsidiary, operating as a multinational ¯rm (indicated by subscript m). Then,
we discuss the optimal integration choice (exporting versus going multinational)
of the international ¯rm before characterizing ¯scal choices by the government.
2Our primary focus is on deriving testable hypotheses to be inferred in the
subsequent empirical investigation. Our three main ¯ndings are as follows.
First, the internationally mobile ¯rm is taxed at a lower rate than an immobile
¯rm operating locally. Second, the existence of trade costs may explain why
the mobile ¯rm prefers paying a certain `tax premium' (i.e., a positive tax rate)
and going multinational as compared to exporting in the absence of taxation.
Third, the tax premium tends to be larger { hence, the tax rate di®erential
between foreign local ¯rms and the multinational producer is lower { if the
internationally mobile ¯rm is relatively important for the economy.
The market price p of the goods supplied in the foreign country is determined
by the inverse demand function ps = ® ¡ ¯ Qs; where s = e;m, ® > 0 is a
preference parameter and ¯ > 0 re°ects market size. Aggregate demand is
Qs = qs + (N ¡ 1)q¤
s s = e;m:
Here, qs is the demand for the mobile ¯rm and q¤
s is the demand the N ¡ 1
symmetric local ¯rms are faced with. The costs of production for both modes
of ownership are
C(qs) = f + ° qs C(q¤
s) = f¤ + °¤ q¤
s s = e;m;
where the ¯rst cost element corresponds to ¯xed costs and the second one
denotes variable (marginal) costs.
In this model, we highlight the e®ects of company taxation on location
decisions. International tax di®erentials are relevant to the extent that a host
country's tax rate matters for a ¯rm's investment decision. To capture this
issue, we assume that ¯rms are subject to a pro¯t tax according to the source
principle.2 The multinational ¯rm's decision problem is
max
qm¸0
¦m(qm) = (1 ¡ ¿¤¤)f(® ¡ ¯Qm ¡ °)qm ¡ fmg; (1)
where ¿¤¤ is the tax rate on the pro¯ts of the mobile ¯rm in the foreign country.
2Taxation at source applies directly, if countries avoid international double taxation by
exempting foreign-earned income from domestic tax. Furthermore, countries relying on the
credit method for double taxation relief generally limit the creditable amount of tax payments
to the domestic tax burden. Hence, taxation at source is again e®ective, if the tax rate in the
source country of the investment exceeds the tax rate in the home country of the investor.
Finally, foreign-earned pro¯ts are generally not taxed in the residence country of the investor
until they are repatriated. This gives ¯rms an incentive to defer repatriation if the home
country employs the tax credit method and if its tax rate is higher than that in the source
country. Source taxation will thus again be e®ective.
3The alternative to going multinational is serving the foreign market via ex-
ports. In this setting, the consumer price in the foreign country is in°uenced
by the costs of delivering the good to the consumers. These trade costs incor-
porate all of the di®erences between countries that render market integration
imperfect, e.g., the costs of cross-border transport. There is a ¯xed trade cost




¦e(qe) = (1 ¡ ¿)f((1 ¡ t)(® ¡ ¯Qe) ¡ °)qe ¡ feg; (2)
where ¿ is the tax rate on pro¯ts levied in the low tax country where the
exporter is domiciled. Let us assume that the tax haven has set ¿ = 0. Then,






s) = (1 ¡ ¿¤)f(® ¡ ¯Qs ¡ °¤)q¤
s ¡ f¤g s = e;m; (3)
where ¿¤ is the tax rate on pro¯ts of local ¯rms in the foreign country.
The ¯rst-order conditions of the maximization problem determine the reac-
tion functions of ¯rms in the two states
qe =
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:
We may solve (4) for the Nash equilibrium that constitutes a ¯xed point of
the reaction functions in the exporting state (qN
e ;q¤N
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(N + 1)(t ¡ 1)¯
q¤N
e =
(t ¡ 1)(® ¡ 2°¤) ¡ °








® + ° ¡ 2°¤
(1 + N)¯
:
To ensure that the reaction functions cross in the non-negative orthant in quan-
tity space, we assume that ® > 2°¤ and restrict our attention to market struc-
tures where the number of ¯rms is large enough so that (N ¡1)°¤ > N° holds.
A reduction of trade costs increases the amount of exports of the international
4¯rm. For trade cost of
t < 1 ¡
N°
® + (N ¡ 1)°¤
a ¯rm's optimal supply is positive.3 A last modeling assumption concerns the
¯xed set-up costs. It is well-known from the literature that the decision of inter-
national ¯rms to export versus going multinational depends on the relative size
of trade costs and ¯xed foreign plant set-up costs (Horstmann and Markusen,
1992). Here, we simply assume that ¯xed costs are su±ciently low to render
the set-up of a foreign subsidiary pro¯table. Using (5) in the pro¯t de¯nition
of the mobile ¯rm determines operating pro¯ts (net of taxes) in the absence of
¯xed costs:
¼e = (1 ¡ ¿)
(N° ¡ (1 ¡ t)(® + (N ¡ 1)°¤))
2
(1 + N)2 (1 ¡ t)¯
(6)
¼m = (1 ¡ ¿¤¤)




Inspection of (6) shows that operating pro¯ts of ¯rms of the same type are
identical in the absence of trade costs so that the markets are perfectly inte-
grated. Furthermore, (6) suggests that t = 0 implies ¼m = ¼e, i.e., both ¯rms
earn identical pro¯ts in the absence of trade costs.
Assume that the international ¯rm chooses the export mode whenever it is
indi®erent between exporting and going multinational. Subtracting ¼m from ¼e
yields a net pro¯t surplus that can be earned through foreign plant set-up as
compared to exporting:
¼m ¡ ¼e = 0 ,
1 ¡ ¿¤¤
1 ¡ ¿
= µ where µ :=
(N° + (t ¡ 1)(® + (N ¡ 1)°¤))
2
(1 ¡ t)(® ¡ N° + (N ¡ 1)°¤)
2
This arbitrage condition reveals that { given that trade costs are positive (t > 0)
{ the foreign country may charge a higher tax rate than the low-tax country
(where ¿ = 0) while still leaving the mobile ¯rm indi®erent between going multi-
national and exporting. Hence, there is a `tax premium' that a multinational
producer is willing to pay before switching to exporting, even if the latter does
not involve any tax payments. Note that this tax premium is absent with per-
fect market integration (where t = 0). In the absence of trade costs, we obtain
3Hence, we assume that the optimal supply of local ¯rms is positive and both exporting
and going multinational generates positive pro¯ts for the international producer. To keep the
analysis simple, we exclude other potential equilibria.
5µ = 1. Hence, an increase in market integration, de¯ned as a reduction in t,
reduces the ability of the foreign economy to tax the pro¯ts of an international
¯rm. Recalling that the tax on local ¯rms, ¿¤, is not constrained by interna-
tional tax arbitrage, we can then directly infer that the foreign country has to
reduce the tax rate on the internationally mobile ¯rm below the rate that is
faced by local ¯rms in order to attract a multinational producer.4 In the empir-
ical analysis, we would therefore expect well integrated European economies to
employ lower tax rates on multinational ¯rms than on local ¯rms (Hypothesis
1).
Let us next discuss the e®ects of an increase in the number of ¯rms on the




2t° (® ¡ °¤)(N° ¡ (1 ¡ t)(® + (N ¡ 1)°¤))
(1 ¡ t)(® ¡ N° + (N ¡ 1)°¤)
3 < 08t > 0:
Hence, if a foreign country creates a tax savings potential for mobile ¯rms (by
setting lower tax rates), we hypothesize that these tax savings are larger if the
market is thinner and mobile ¯rms are relatively important for the economy,
all else equal (Hypothesis 2).
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Estimation strategy for the impact of endogenous foreign
ownership on subsidiary tax savings
When estimating the impact of foreign ownership of a subsidiary on tax pay-
ments we have to account for the endogeneity of the former, as suggested by the
above theoretical model. Econometrically, we have to estimate the impact of an
endogenous binary (treatment) variable with entry one if a subsidiary exhibits
a foreign ultimate owner and zero else. In this case, the endogeneity accrues
to systematic selection of plants into foreign plant ownership. Then, the im-
pact of foreign ownership on an outcome such as plant-level tax payments can
neither be estimated from a simple mean comparison of an outcome variable
(here, tax payments) between foreign- and domestically-owned plants nor from
a regression model where foreign ownership is treated as an exogenous deter-
4This hypothesis is similar to the ¯ndings in Janeba and Peters (1999), who consider a
setting where two countries compete for internationally mobile portfolio capital, but at the
same time have access to a completely inelastic domestic tax base. There, revenue maximizing
governments levy the maximum tax on the immobile domestic tax base, but a zero tax on the
internationally mobile portfolio capital. In contrast to Janeba and Peters (1999), we consider
an endogenous choice of plant location with imperfectly competitive product markets.
6minant of the outcome. The bias of such an exogenous treatment approach
is referred to as one of self-selection or selection into treatment (here, foreign
plant ownership; see Wooldridge, 2002).
However, the econometrics literature on program evaluation provides sev-
eral alternative strategies that are able to eliminate the self-selection bias. Each
of these strategies hinges on a di®erent set of assumptions. In case that one as-
sumes that foreign plant ownership is determined by a set of variables that are
observable, one can stick to estimation procedures that rely on the assumption
of (self-)selection on observables. The international economics and industrial
economics literatures on the endogenous organization structure of ¯rms identify
characteristics that are observable (see, e.g., Girma and GÄ org, 2006), so that
it seems natural to apply a related procedure here. Moreover, with selection
on observables there are procedures that rely on a parametric approach and
others that adopt a non-parametric approach of treatment e®ect identi¯cation.
Obviously, the latter is less restrictive than the former. Matching is such a non-
parametric endogenous treatment e®ect estimator (see Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983; Angrist, 1998; Dehejia and Wahba, 1999; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd;
1997, 1998; Rosenbaum, 2002; Rubin, 2006; Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith,
1999; and Morgan and Harding, 2006 provide a survey). In contrast to other
procedures, it eliminates the bias from self-selection into treatment by com-
paring the outcome (here, the tax payments) of the treated (of foreign-owned
subsidiaries) not to all untreated observations but only to those that are sim-
ilar (ideally, they are identical) with regard to a compulsory set of observable
determinants of self-selection into treatment. While self-selection leads to mean-
dependence in outcome and a bias of the unconditional mean comparison, con-
ditioning on the set of observables establishes conditional mean-independence
(see Wooldridge, 2002) so that the comparison of the mean of the treated to
those control observations that are identical except of being untreated is a valid
estimator of the treatment e®ect on outcome.
Hence, matching requires two steps. First, those control units need to be
selected that are similar to the treated ones with regard to the underlying
set of observables. Again there are alternative procedures available, but it is
particularly e±cient to collect the information of all observable variables into
a single metric, referred to as the propensity score. With a binary treatment
indicator, the latter is nothing else than the predicted probability of treatment
participation from a binary choice model (e.g., probit, logit, or other nonlinear
probability models). 'Similarity' of a control observation to a treated one is
7then determined by the similarity in the predicted treatment participation.5 In
a second step, one estimates the treatment e®ect from the average di®erence in
the outcome vectors of the treated and the matched controls.
One can distinguish among di®erent types of matching, depending on the
de¯nition of valid control units. Nearest neighbor (also referred to as one-to-
one) matching uses for each treated observation only a single (or a few identical)
control units with the closest di®erence in propensity score to the treated unit.6
Radius matching uses all control observations in the match whose propensity
score lies within a given radius around that of the treated unit. Whereas the
number of controls is ¯xed with k-nearest neighbor matching independent of
the di®erence in the propensity score between matched and control observa-
tions, radius matching establishes a minimum bound on the matching quality
while leaving the number of matched controls undetermined. Kernel matching
uses more and, eventually, all control units. Yet, in contrast to the exoge-
nous treatment e®ect estimator, it applies weights to the control observations
which decline in the treated-to-control propensity score di®erence. While each
of these estimators is consistent, there is a trade-o® between precision and ef-
¯ciency in small samples. Radius and kernel matching use a larger number of
control units than nearest neighbor matching which increases precision. How-
ever, kernel matching uses less suited controls { although their weight is small
{ in estimating treatment e®ects. The latter can lead to biased causal e®ects
estimates in small samples.
The literature distinguishes among three key concepts of treatment e®ects.
The ¯rst one is referred to as the average treatment e®ect of the treated (ATT).
This is the estimated di®erence in outcome among the actually treated and the
controls. For practical purposes this is the e®ect that one is typically interested
in with applied work. In the subsequent empirical analysis, we focus on ATT
as well. The second treatment e®ect concept is the average treatment e®ect
of the untreated (ATU). The latter is the negative of the average di®erence
of the untreated observations' outcome and that of the matched treated units.
Hence, ATU re°ects a hypothetical e®ect of treatment on the actually untreated
units. Finally, the average treatment e®ect (ATE) is a weighted average of ATT
5However, the propensity score is only a valid similarity metric if each and everyone of the
underlying observables in the nonlinear probability model is similar between the treated and
the 'similar' controls on average. If this is not the case, one needs to eliminate the possible
resulting bias by conditioning on the unbalanced observables in the mean comparison of the
outcome between the treated and the matched controls (see Blundell and Costa Dias, 2002).
6In general, under k-nearest neighbor matching one could match k control units onto each
treated one.
8and ATU, where the shares of the treated and untreated observations serve as
weights. ATE re°ects the treatment e®ect for a randomly drawn observation,
irrespective of whether it was actually treated or not.
3.2 Data
We use the Amadeus database compiled by Bureau van Dijk, which covers
¯nancial and ownership statements for about 250;000 private and publicly-
owned ¯rms of 34 European countries (including Eastern European economies)
since 1991.7 We focus on manufacturing ¯rms according to the NACE industry
codes reported in the database.
While data are available for consolidated and non-consolidated accounting
statements, we exclude the consolidated accounts so that the unit of observation
is a subsidiary and each subsidiary's balance sheet positions are identi¯ed sep-
arately. This enables us to compare the tax payments of similar units that are
foreign- versus domestically-owned. We employ a cross-section of the data with
averages for the late 1990s. For instance, the latter ensures that we can use in-
formation about plants that are only recorded once in the years 1996-2003. The
resulting data-set covers a sample of 33;577 subsidiaries. Table 1 summarizes
the distribution of the included subsidiaries across 27 European economies, 935
regions,8 and 331 NACE 4-digit industries. On average, there are around 1210
(35) ¯rms per country (region), and about 99 ¯rms per industry.
Two pieces of information are central to our analysis: subsidiary-level tax
payments as the dependent (or outcome) variable and foreign ownership of
subsidiaries as an (endogenous) determinant thereof. As a measure of the for-
mer, we use a subsidiary's actual tax payments per employee in Euros and,
alternatively, its tax payments to total assets ratio. Information about foreign
subsidiary ownership is captured by an indicator variable that is unity for sub-
sidiaries with at least one foreign ultimate owner, and zero else. The descriptive
statistics for these variables are summarized at the top of Table 2.
According to the information there, the average tax payment per employee
amounts to about 1;032 Euros with a corresponding average tax-to-total-asset-
ratio of about 3:1. Around 15 percent of all plants in the sample are foreign-
owned. The bottom part of the table summarizes descriptive statistics of ob-
7For the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation a
¯rm is included in the Amadeus database if one of the following criteria is ful¯lled: operating
revenue equals at least 15 million Euros (10 million Euros for the other countries), total assets
equal at least 30 million Euros (20 million Euros for the other countries), and the number of
employees equals at least 200 (150 for the other countries).
8The regional aggregates roughly correspond to NUTS 4-digit units.
9Table 1: Allocation of firms across countries, regions, and industries
Number 27 935 331
Number of firms:
     Average 1212.37 35.01 98.89
     Standard deviation 1515.39 94.23 127.88
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Standard dev.
Endogenous variables
Tax payments per employee 1,032.396 34,872.020
Tax payments relative to total assets 3.143 60.618
Foreign multinational plant ownership dummy variable 0.151 0.358
Observables in the selection models
Firm age 24.477 26.302
Firm age squared 1,290.898 4,198.332
Plants per region and industry 10.925 26.179
Foreign MNE affiliates to national firms per region and industry 0.151 0.292
Employees per region 250,230.900 563,968.100
Number of employees per firm in region and industry 481.661 879.419
Regional worker compensation 2,221,066.000 5,477,029.000
Industry level wage cost per employee 10,927.470 11,343.950
Industry level cost of intermediate goods 9,974,800.000 7,568,883.000
Further variables used with interaction terms
Plant-level employment 477.470 1,311.977





Notes: The total number of firms is 33577 and consists of foreign-owned 
subsidiaries in a country and domestic firms.
1) Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Italy, Latria, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Ukraine, United Kingdom
10servable explanatory variables of foreign plant ownership. More details on these
variables and a rationalization of their use are provided in the next subsection.
3.3 Estimation and results
In the following, we estimate the ATT of exhibiting a foreign owner, assum-
ing that foreign owners do not set-up/acquire foreign subsidiaries at random.
Therefore, in a ¯rst step, we need to determine the probability for a plant to
participate in the treatment of exhibiting a foreign owner conditional on a set of
observable variables. We estimate three alternative non-linear probability mod-
els: a probit model that rests on a normal distribution; a logit model which
assumes a logistic distribution function; and a complementary log-log model.9
Which one of the nonlinear probability models ¯t the data best is an empirical
{ and actually a testable { question.
We determine the probability of exhibiting a foreign owner by the following
set of variables: ¯rm age and ¯rm age squared; the number of plants, the
ratio of foreign MNE a±liates to domestic ¯rms, and the number of employees
per ¯rm in region r and industry n; worker compensation in region r; wage
cost per employee and cost of intermediate goods in industry n. It is well-
known that older plants and ¯rms are traditionally bigger and more productive
than others so that we assume ¯rm age to be positively correlated with the
propensity to exhibit a foreign owner. The region-and industry-speci¯c variables
are aggregates of individual level information from the Amadeus database. The
region-by-industry plant number, the ratio of foreign MNE a±liates to domestic
¯rms, and the number of employees per ¯rm capture two di®erent kinds of
determinants. On the one hand, these variables re°ect the overall attractiveness
of a market, the thickness at the intermediate goods supplier market, and other
linkage e®ects. On the other hand, these variables capture the thickness at the
subsidiary's market and, hence, the competitive pressure for a subsidiary, the
pressure at factor markets and other adverse factors for plant location. Hence,
it is not feasible to disentangle the stimulating versus impeding e®ects of foreign
ownership of these variables ex ante. Similarly, regional worker compensation
or industry characteristics such as the wage cost per employee and expenditures
for intermediate goods re°ect such stimulating and impeding in°uences.10
9The cumulative density function (cdf) of the complementary log-log model for a variable
z is de¯ned as F(z) = 1¡e
¡ez
and, at medium probability levels, it strictly lies to the left of
the normal or logistic cdf's. The change in probability at z = 0 is more similar to the normal
cdf and higher than that of the logistic cdf.
10For instance, wages might measure skill levels of workers and their productivity, but they
also might represent sheer cost.
11Table 3 summarizes the ¯ndings for the three aforementioned non-linear
probability models. Overall, the explanatory power is exceptionally high for all
three models. However, the pseudo-R2 is highest for the probit model which
rests on the normal density function. The di®erence in the log-likelihoods
among the three models is high enough to reject the logit and the comple-
mentary log-log model signi¯cantly at one percent against the probit. Given
the good explanatory power of the model, we can be con¯dent to rely on the
corresponding propensity score metric to de¯ne similarity among the treated
and the controls for matching.
While matching is able to eliminate the bias of self-selection, the question is
how large this bias actually is with the application at hand. An estimate thereof
can be obtained from a comparison of the exogenous treatment e®ect estimator
{ i.e., the simple mean comparison in the tax payment outcome variable between
the foreign-owned and domestically-owned plants { with the matching estimator
re°ecting the conditional mean comparison. Table 4 provides this comparison
with a nearest-neighbor matching estimator for ATT and two tax payment
variables as alternative outcomes: tax payments per employee and tax payments
per total assets.
The ¯ndings in Table 4 indicate that none of the two exogenous treatment
e®ects is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. By way of contrast, the matching
estimates of ATT are substantially larger in absolute value and signi¯cantly dif-
ferent from zero at one percent. Hence, with the data-set at hand self-selection
into foreign ownership leads to a substantial downward bias in absolute value
of the impact of foreign ownership on tax payments. With the nearest-neighbor
matching approach we estimate an ATT of foreign ownership on tax payments
of approximately ¡594 Euros per employee, corresponding to tax savings of 56
percent as compared to domestic plants. The ATT on tax payments per total
assets amounts to ¡0:204. These ¯ndings support Hypothesis 1.
3.4 Extensions
The estimates in Table 4 re°ect averages. Of course, consistent estimates thereof
do not require that there is no variation in the treatment e®ect across the
treated. This variation could even be related systematically to observable vari-
ables.11 In particular, we conjecture that the individual treatment e®ect of the
treated depends on market thickness measured by the number of plants and
11For instance, see Wooldridge (2002, pp. 626-629) for a model where ATE varies system-





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14on market attractiveness for multinationals measured by the ratio of foreign to
national a±liates in region r and industry n as well as on ¯rm size in terms of
the number of employees. A larger market thickness implies less weight for a
single foreign owner in the tax base, all else equal. According to Hypothesis 2,
we would expect the corresponding tax deductions to be lower and, hence, tax
payments to be higher. Relative market attractiveness for MNEs is likely asso-
ciated with a lower number of producers (e.g., due to economies of scale) and a
larger weight of a single MNE in the tax base so that one would conjecture tax
payments to rise in market attractiveness for MNEs. Finally, from a bargain-
ing and imperfect labor market perspective which is not re°ected in the above
model we would hypothesize foreign owners of larger foreign subsidiaries to be
able to extract higher rents from the host country tax authorities than smaller
foreign owners of subsidiaries. The corresponding results are summarized in
Table 5.
Again, we estimate the impact on two alternative tax payment ratios. The
determinants involved in the interaction e®ects with foreign ownership in Table
5 are demeaned as suggested by Wooldridge (2002). We estimate three spec-
i¯cations to illustrate that the explanatory variables used in the interactions
are orthogonal enough so that the sign of the interaction e®ect of ATT is not
changed as we augment the speci¯cation and, qualitatively, we do not attribute
the sign of the impact to, say, market thickness (the number of plants in re-
gion r and industry n), where it should be attributed to one of the other two
determinants. The results of this augmented outcome equation indicate that
foreign-owned plants in thinner markets with a high fraction of foreign-owned
plants pay lower taxes as suggested by Hypothesis 2. Moreover, the tax savings
are higher for larger plants.
In the remainder of this section, we consider ATT estimates based on alter-
native matching procedures, namely radius and kernel matching. Furthermore,
we follow Blundell and Costa Dias (2002) by including the number of plants
along with the ratio of foreign-owned and domestically-owned subsidiaries per
region r and industry n as control variables in the outcome equation, since they
are signi¯cantly di®erent at ¯ve percent between the treated and the matched
controls (see Blundell and Costa Dias, 2002).12 Table 6 summarizes the corre-
sponding results.
12Table 7 in the Appendix provides tests on the balancing of the observable variables used
in the selection models among the treated and the matched control subsidiaries. According
to that table, two variables are signi¯cantly di®erent among these sub-samples of the data
at ¯ve percent: the number of plants per region and industry and the ratio of foreign- to









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16Table 6: Sensitivity analysis (including controls in the regressions that are significant at 10 percent in Table 8)
(Including controls in the regressions that are significant at 10 percent in Table 7 and using alternative estimators)
Average effect of foreign plant ownership on tax payments -591.243 * -0.203 **
(362.780) (0.101)
Average effect of foreign plant ownership on tax payments -446.738 -0.159
(380.027) (0.109)
Interaction terms with
   Plants per region and industry 17.950 0.010
(13.855) (0.007)
   Number of foreign MNE affiliates to national firms per region -1251.913 * -0.777 *
(701.934) (0.416)
   Plant-level number of employees -0.256 *** 0.000 ***
(0.078) (0.000)
Average effect of foreign plant ownership on tax payments -468.875 * -0.186 **
(264.875) (0.084)
Average effect of foreign plant ownership on tax payments -318.907 -0.115
(282.812) (0.093)
Interaction terms with
   Plants per region and industry 16.512 0.004
(13.302) (0.007)
   Number of foreign MNE affiliates to national firms per region -1434.762 ** -0.810 *
(729.705) (0.418)
   Plant-level number of employees -0.268 *** -0.0002 ***
(0.090) (0.00003)
Average effect of foreign plant ownership on tax payments -375.196 * -0.384 **
(222.597) (0.160)
Average effect of foreign plant ownership on tax payments 113.793 -0.265 **
(215.665) (0.114)
Interaction terms with
   Plants per region and industry 38.762 *** 0.018 **
(11.310) (0.008)
   Number of foreign MNE affiliates to national firms per region -2374.149 *** -0.395
(629.883) (0.406)
   Plant-level number of employees -0.244 *** -0.0002 ***
(0.073) (0.00004)






Radius matching (radius = 0.0005)
Notes: Estimation excludes all subsidiaries of multinational firms in the parent country. Standard error in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
a) The average effect of foreign-ownerwship on tax payments is measured as the difference to domestically owned firms' tax
payments.
17We ¯nd that, in qualitative as well as quantitative terms, the unbalancedness
of the number of plants and the ratio of foreign-owned and domestically-owned
subsidiaries does not a®ect the ATT estimates (compare the ¯gures at the top
of Table 6 with those at the bottom in Table 4). Similar conclusions apply for
the signs of the interaction terms, where conditioning on the unbalanced ob-
servables only slightly reduces the precision of the interaction term parameter
estimates (compare the nearest-neighbor matching results in Table 6 with those
at the bottom in Table 5). Finally, the ¯ndings of the nearest-neighbor match-
ing estimator are similar to those of a radius matching or a kernel matching
estimator (compare the results at the top of Table 6 to the other ones in that
table).13 Obviously, the e±ciency of the kernel matching estimator leads to
higher signi¯cance levels for the parameter estimates as with nearest-neighbor
or radius matching.
4 Conclusions
The tax payments between the average foreign-owned subsidiary and a
domestically-owned twin are signi¯cantly di®erent in Europe. There are several
possible reasons for such a discrepancy, ranging from ¯rm-level policies such as
pro¯t shifting to tax authority policies such as preferential treatment. In the
theoretical model we concentrate on the latter to derive a set of empirically
testable hypotheses about the determinants of the gap in tax payments from a
model with imperfect product markets.
Our main goal is providing a quanti¯cation of the tax savings through
foreign plant ownership. We employ data on 33;577 plants in 27 European
economies between 1996 and 2003 to estimate the average tax savings e®ect
of foreign plant ownership, while considering endogenous selection of foreign
ownership. Our estimates suggest a savings e®ect of 594 Euros per employee or
about 56 percent as compared to domestically-owned subsidiaries. For larger
plants and ones in thinner markets with a strong relative importance of foreign
ownership the tax savings e®ect is even higher. These ¯ndings are robust both
in qualitative and in quantitative terms to alternative estimation procedures
and other sensitivity checks.
13We use a quite small radius of 0:0005 to ensure a high quality of the matches. Then,
for a foreign-owned subsidiary with an estimated 90 percent foreign ownership probability
only those domestically-owned subsidiaries with a probability in the interval [0:8995;0:9005]
are used as matches. With kernel matching, we employ an Epanechnikov kernel using a
bandwidth of 0:01.
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21Appendix
Table 7 investigates the balancing property for the observable variables em-
ployed in the selection equation models to determine the probability for a sub-
sidiary to be foreign-owned. Of all determinants, only two were signi¯cantly
di®erent at ¯ve percent among the treated (foreign-owned) and the matched
control subsidiaries. To avoid any associated bias with this, we estimate treat-
ment e®ects where we condition on these variables to eliminate their in°uence
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